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哈佛大学比较政治学课程书单
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小萝卜头不是萝卜叶 2022/7/26 9:48:01 编辑 1 楼
哈佛大学博士班的比较政治课程由Steve Levitsky和Daniel Ziblatt讲授。

Steve Levitsky教授的研究领域为政党政治、威权主义和民主化，并且主要关注拉丁美洲的政治发展。

Daniel Ziblatt教授的研究领域为欧洲政治、国家构建、民主化和历史政治经济学。


Foundational Works: Classical Approaches to the Problem of Modernization

1. Karl Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” American Political Science Review, vol. 55 (Sept. 1961)
2. Alex Inkeles, “The Modernization of Man,” in Myron Weiner, ed. Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth (New York: Basic Books, 1966), pp. 138-150.
3. Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 1-92, 192-263. [note: you may skim pp. 219-263]
4. Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), chapters 7-9 (pp. 413-483)
5. Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis. Comparative Studies in Society and History 16, No.4 (September 1974), pp. 387-415.
6. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and
Democracy: The Human Development Sequence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Chapters 1-2 (pp. 15-76)


Competing Approaches to Comparative Politics

1. Gabriel Almond and Stephen Genco, “Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics,” World Politics, 29 (1977). Economic Approaches
2. Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Cornell University Press, 1986), Ch 1 (pp. 17-34) and Ch 6 (pp. 221-240).
3. Ronald Rogowski, “Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade,”American Political Science Review 81, No. 4 (December 1987): 1121-1136.


Cultural Approaches
4. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), pp. 1-44, 307-315, and 337-374).
5. Harry Eckstein, “A Culturalist Theory of Political Change,” American Political Science Review 83, No. 3 (September 1988): 789-804.
6. Lisa Wedeen, “Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science,”American Political Science Review, vol. 96, no. 4 (Dec. 2002).
7. David J. Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon, “A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?” Comparative Politics, 11 (January 1979): 127-146.


Statist Approaches
8. Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research.” In Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 3-37.


Rational Choice Approaches
9. Barbara Geddes, Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics (University of Michigan Press, 2003), chapter 5 (pp. 175-211).


Path Dependent Approaches

10. Paul Pierson, Politics in Time (Princeton University Press, 2004), Introduction (pp. 1-10 only), Chapters 1-2 (pp. 17-78).


Institutions and Institutional Analysis

Overview and Approaches
1. Peter A. Hall and Rosemary Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New
Institutionalisms,” Political Studies, 44 (December 1996)
2. Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, “Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science,” in Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, eds.Political Science: State of the Discipline (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), pp. 693-721.
3. Barry Weingast, “Rational-Choice Institutionalism.” in Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, eds. Political Science: State of the Discipline (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), pp. 660-692.


Institutional Effects
4. Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge University Press, 1992), Chapters 1-3 (pp.1-54) and Chapter 13 (pp. 273-287).
5. Arend Lijphart, “Constitutional Choices for New Democracies,” Journal of Democracy (Winter 1991).
6. George Tsebelis, “Veto Players and Institutional Analysis,” Governance 13: 4 (October 2000): 441-474.
7. Jonathan Rodden, “Back to the Future: Endogenous Institutions and Comparative Politics,” in Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds.Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp.333-357.
8. Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda.” Perspectives on Politics 2, No. 4 (2004): 725-740.


Explaining Institutional Design
1. Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England,” Journal of Economic History 49, No 4 (December 1989): 803-832.
2. Terry Moe, “Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6 (1990): 213-253.
3. Paul Pierson, Politics in Time (Princeton University Press, 2004), chapter 4.


Institutional Change

4. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,” in Mahoney and Thelen, eds. Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 1-37.

5. Avner Greif and David Laitin, “A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change,” American Political Science Review 98, No. 4 (November 2004): 633-652.


The Logics and Methods of Comparative Politics

1. Arend Lijphart, “The Comparable Cases Strategy in Comparative Research,” Comparative Political Studies (July 1975): 158-177
2. Theda Skocpol and M. Somers, The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 65 (1980): 174-197
3. John Gerring, “The Case Study,” in Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 90-122.
4. Jasket Sekhon, “Quality Meets Quantity: Case Studies, Conditional Probability, and Counterfactuals,” Perspectives on Politics (June 2004): 281-293
5. Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry(Princeton U Press), pp. 3-9; 36-46; 115-149; 168-69; 176-182; 185-187; 189-193; 208-228
6. Henry Brady and David Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, Chapter 1 (pp. 3-20) chapter 6 (pp. 85-102), Chapters 12-13 (195-266).
7. Peter Hall, “Aligning Ontology and Methodology,” in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds. Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 373-404.
8. Peter Hall, “Systematic Process Analysis: When and How to Use it,”European Political Science 7, 3 (August 2008): 304-317.
9. Giovanni Sartori “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,” American Political Science Review (December 1970): 1033-1053 20
10. David Collier and Robert Adcock, “Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research,” American Political Science Review 95 (3) September 2001: pp. 529-546.
11. Evan Lieberman, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research,” American Political Science Review (August 2005) 99, 3: 435-452


Political Economy of Development

1. W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1960] 1990), pp. 1-12
2. Gerschenkron, Alexander, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp.5-30.
3. North, Douglas C., Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 83-104, 107-117.
4. Johnson, Chalmers, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), pp. 3-34.
5. Alice Amsden, The Rise of “The Rest”: Challenges to the West from LateIndustrializing Economies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 1-17, 125-160.
6. Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), pp. 1-105.
7. Przeworski, Adam, and Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 142-179.
8. Jeffrey Sachs, “Tropical Underdevelopment,” NBER Working Paper (2001), pp. 1-40.
9. Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi, “Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development” Journal of Economic Growth 9 (2004), pp. 131-158.
10. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (2002): 1231-94


The State and State-Building

1. Stephen Krasner, “Approaches to the State,” Comparative Politics (January 1984), pp. 223-246
2. Douglas North. 1986. “A Neoclassical Theory of the State,” in Jon Elster, ed.Rational Choice (New York University Press, 1986), pp. 248-261.
3. Barbara Geddes, Politicians Dilemma (University of California Press, 1994), pp. 1-19.
4. Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime” in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In(Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 169-191
5. Thomas Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 1-34.
6. Desmond King and Robert Lieberman, “Ironies of State Building: A Comparative Perspective on the American State.” World Politics 61, No. 3 (July 2009): 547-588.
7. Robert Bates, Prosperity and Violence (2nd edition) (WW Norton, 2009), Chapters 3-4 (pp. 34-66).
8. Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 12-31.
9. Miguel Centeno “Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth Century Latin America,” American Journal of Sociology 102 (6) 1997, pp. 1565-1605.
10. Dan Slater, “Can Leviathan be a Democrat? Competitive Elections, Robust Mass Politics, and State Infrastructural Power.” Studies in Comparative International Development 43:4 (December 2008), pp. 252-272
11. Anna Grzymala Busse, “The Discreet Charm of Formal Institutions: Postcommunist Party Competition and State Oversight,” Comparative Political Studies (December 2006), pp. 1-30.
12. Robert H. Bates, When Things Fall Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 3-6, 15-29, 97-139.


Political Regimes I: Classical Approaches to Democratization

1. Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), ch 1 (pp. 1-16), chapters 3-6 (pp. 33-104).
2. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1960), chapter 2.
3. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World Politics, 49 (January 1997), pp. 155-183.
4. Dankwart Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,”Comparative Politics, 2 (April 1970), pp. 337-364.
5. Carles Boix, Democracy and Redistribution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 1-59.
6. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), chapters 2-3 (pp. 15-87)
7. Ziblatt, Daniel, “How Did Europe Democratize?” World Politics 58:2 (January 2006), 311-38.
8. Juan Linz, “The Perils of Presidentialism,” Journal of Democracy 1, No. 1 (Winter 1990).


Political Regimes II: Democracy and Authoritarianism in the PostCold War Era

1. Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 13-108.
2. Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 115-144.
3. Michael Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53, No. 3: 325-361.
4. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming)[excerpts from chapters 1-2]
5. Michael McFaul. “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World.” World Politics 54, no.2 (January 2002): 212-244.
6. Jeffrey S. Kopstein and David A. Reilly. 2000. “Geographic Diffusion and the
Transformation of the Postcommunist World.” World Politics 53, No. 1: 1-37.
7. Elisabeth Wood, "An Insurgent Path to Democracy: Popular Mobilization, Economic Interests and Regime Transition in South Africa and El Salvador.”Comparative Political Studies 34, No. 8 (October 2001): 862-888.
8. Dan Slater, “Revolutions, Crackdowns, and Quiescence: Communal Elites and Democratic Mobilization in Southeast Asia,” American Journal of Sociology 115:1 (July 2009).
9. Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa,” World Politics 46, No. 4 (July 1994), pp. 453-489.


Civil Society, Contentious Politics, and Social Movements

1. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 1-52
2. Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 9-27; 62-78.
3. John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: a Partial Theory” American Journal of Sociology 82 (1977), pp. 1212-41.
4. Herbert Kitschelt, “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest,”British Journal of Political Science, 16 (1986), pp. 57-85.
5. Kevin O’Brien, “Rightful Resistance,” World Politics 49 (1) (1996): 31-55
6. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Cornell University Press, 1997), pp.1-29;
7. Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy(Princeton University Press, 1993) (Chapters 3, 4, and 6), pp. 63-120; 163-185
8. Sheri Berman, “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic”,World Politics 49 (1997), pp. 401-439
9. Robert Putnam “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,” Journal of Democracy (1995)
10. Theda Skocpol, Marshall Ganz, and Ziad Munson, “A Nation of Organizers: the Institutional Origins of Civic Voluntarism in the United States,” American Political Science Review 94 (3) (September 2000), pp. 527-546.
11. Lily Tsai, Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China", American Political Science Review 101, no.2 (May 2007), pp.355-372


Ethnicity, Ethnic Conflict, and Political Violence

1. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 3-89.
2. Robert Bates, “Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa,” in Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola, eds., State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), pp.153-167.
3. David Laitin, “Hegemony and Religious Conflict,” in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich
Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 285-316.
4. Daniel Posner, "The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi," American Political Science Review 98, No. 4 (November 2004), pp. 529-545.
5. James Fearon and David Laitin, “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,”American Political Science Review, 90, no. 4 (December 1996): 715-735.
6. Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival 35, No. 1
(Spring 1993): 27-47.
7. James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.”American Political Science Review. 97(1), 2003, pp. 75-90.
8. Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 3-52.
9. Steven Wilkinson, Votes and Violence (Cambridge University Press), Chapter 1 (pp. 1-18)
10. Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Ethnic Defection in Civil War,” Comparative Political Studies, 41, No. 8 (August 2008): 1043-1068.
11. Ashutosh Varshney, “Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality”Perspectives on Politics, 1(1), 2003, pp. 85-99.
12. James Habyarimana, Macartan Humphries, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?” American Political Science Review 101, No. 4 (2007): 709-725.

13. Lijphart, Arend, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 1-3; 16-52 [classic work on consociationalism]


Voting, Elections, and Electoral Systems

Voters and Voting
1. John Aldrich, “Rational Choice and Turnout," American Journal of Political Science, 37, (1993): 246-78.
2. Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds.), Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford University Press, 2000), chapters 2(Dalton) and 3 (Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg) [pp. 19-76]
3. Bingham G. Powell and Guy Whitten. “A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context,” American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993).
4. Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, “Citizen-Politician Linkages: An
Introduction,” in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, eds. Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 1-46.
5. Kanchan Chandra, “Counting Heads: A Theory of Voter and Elite Behavior in Patronage Democracies,” in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, eds.Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 84-109.


Electoral Rules and their Consequences
6. Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, Ch 8 (electoral systems) (pp. 143-170)
7. Gary W. Cox, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems (Cambridge University Press, 1997), chapters 1-3 (3-68) and 10-12 (pp. 181-237).Recommended: chapters 4-5 (pp. 69-122)
8. John M Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: a Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas,” Electoral Studies 14:4 (1995): 417-439.


Explaining Electoral Design
9.Carles Boix, “Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies,” American Political Science Review, 93, No. 3 (September1999): 609-624.
10. Thomas Cusack, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice “Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems,” American Political Science Review 101, No. 3 (August 2007): 373-391.


Political Parties and Party Systems

1. E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government (Transaction Publishers, 1942/2004), pp. 35-53.
2. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: HarperCollins, 1957), chapters 7-8 (pp. 96-141).
3. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction,” in Peter Mair, ed. The West European Party System(Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 91-138.
4. Maurice Duverger, “Caucus and Branch, Cadre Parties and Mass Parties,” in Peter Mair, ed. The West European Party System (Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 37-45.
5. Otto Kirchheimer, “The Catch-All Party,” in Peter Mair, ed. The West European Party System (Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 50-60.
6. John Aldrich, Why Parties?: The Origins and Transformation of Party Politics in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 3-61.
7. Martin Shefter, Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience (Princeton University Press, 1994), chapter 2 (pp 21-60).
8. Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe (Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 1-28; 58-113.


Political Economy of Advanced Democracies

1. Allan H. Meltzer, and Scott. F. Richard, “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government,” Journal of Political Economy 89 (1981), 914-17 [Read only first 3 pages.]
2. Harold Wilensky, Rich Democracies (University of California Press, 2002), pp. 3-14.
3. Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State (University of Chicago Press, 2001), pp. 14-32.
4. Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Cornell University Press, 1985) Chapter 1 (pp. 17-38) and Chapter 3 (pp. 80-135).
5. Gösta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton University Press, 1990), Chapters 1-3 (pp. 1-78).
6. Torben Iversen and David Soskice, “Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others,” American Political Science Review 100:2 (2006):165-181.

7. Manow, Philip, “Electoral Rules, Class Coalitions, and Welfare State Regimes, or how to Explain Esping-Andersen with Stein Rokkan” Socio-Economic Review (2009) 7: 101-121
8. Hall, Peter A., and David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 3-68.
9. Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange, “Political Responses to Interdependence: What’s ‘left’ for the Left?” International Organization 45, No. 4 (Autumn): 539-564.
10. Paul Pierson, “The New Politics of the Welfare State,” World Politics(1996): 143-179.
11. Jacob Hacker, “Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State,”American Political Science Review 98, No. 4 (2004): 243-260
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